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Unfinished democratization: 
the failure of public safety
ALBA ZALUAR
Introduction 
MY STUDIES of urban violence in Brazil led me to reflect on two paradoxes and an enigma that have developed in the country in recent decades, specifically since the return to democracy. The 
first paradox is that the democratization process, which began in 1978, was 
accompanied by growing rates of criminality and especially by homicides 
among young men. The second is that the nation was built on ideas of 
cordiality and conciliation recently abandoned in the face of criticism from 
heavyweight intellectuals concerning their apparent lack of a notion of 
citizenship. Nevertheless, since as neither forgiveness nor pacification were 
publicly discussed at the end of the military regime, what have replaced those 
ideals are mechanisms of personal revenge and uncontrollable aggressive 
impulses. 
Strategic military observation point with a panoramic view of the Rocinha Favela, 
in Rio de Janeiro, the largest in Latin America with 150 thousand residents.
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The enigma is that the brutal violence now savaging young men has 
seen no corresponding upsurge among women in general and men of other age 
groups. Unlike in ethnic conflicts, where women, the elderly and children are 
also killed or subjected to violence, sexual crimes in Brazil have not increased 
as much as homicide. Murders are committed among young men and have 
grown exponentially in many states of the Federative Republic. The average 
homicide rates among young men in the 15 to 29 age-bracket rose nationwide 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s. By the year 2000, 93% of the cases in this age group 
involved young men and only 3% women. The question is why?  
Three dimensions are used to understand this. The first comes from 
abroad, more a fruit of the international context than of Brazil’s own internal 
dynamic, while the other two are clearly home-grown issues. 
First of all, I will analyze the importance and limits of the macro-
social explanations for violent criminality, such as poverty and social 
exclusion, in terms of their interactions with the transnational mechanisms 
of organized crime surrounding drugs and arms dealing and the perverse 
symbiosis such trades have developed with poverty and vulnerable youth in 
many countries. 
Secondly, I will focus on the institutional inertia behind the persistent 
violations of civil rights, as well as the historically deep-rooted inefficiency of 
the justice system and its articulations with the political field. 
Thirdly, but by no means least importantly, it is also essential to look 
at the micro-social processes surrounding the involvement of young men 
in the drug trade. We must understand the subjective formations of street 
respect or credibility and a man’s place in the pecking order, in other words, 
the concept of masculinity and how it relates to demonstrations of force 
and the possession of firearms. It is also necessary to discuss the long term 
institutional processes involved in this reflection. We must consider police 
violence against the poor in general and violence among poor youths that 
have been allowed to take hold in a society with a fragile Rule of Law and 
in a State that never had a monopoly on legitimate violence. In Brazil, there 
has always been a gap between the formal rights established by law and the 
reality in practice. Thus, it is important to focus not only on the letter of 
the law, but mainly on social processes, such as informal rules or the implicit 
practices of the actors. 
The crime industry or globalized crime-business       
One of the main global problems today is the inability to control 
illegal drug use, and particularly the brutal criminal world that was created 
to ensure that narcotics circulate around the globe with impressive logistical 
efficiency. The illegal drug market is now said to be one of the world’s largest 
economic sectors. Nevertheless, it is only part of the operational system of a 
crime-business with varying degrees of organization across numerous different 
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sectors, all using similar networks and mechanisms to make their operations 
appear legit. 
As economic sectors, and especially the illegal ones, mix formal and 
informal markets, various legal and illegal sectors intermingle in client chains 
that run from governmental institutions to drug traffickers, allowing illicit 
businesses to penetrate into many legal sectors of society. These sectors 
frequently function in the formal economy, but obtain a part of their profits 
from the trafficking of drugs and other merchandise. Such activities are diverse 
in the sense that they imply other criminal acts, such as the theft of goods 
to bankroll the purchase of drugs and its precursors (Zaluar, 1994; Geffray, 
1996; UNDCP, 1997). They also follow the financial networks to launder 
money that comes from many other illegal activities, such as contraband, 
government corruption and the many existing forms of trafficking. 
This is clear in the case of banks, real estate agents and transportation 
companies that supply services to the illegal businesses and their key money-
laundering mechanisms. But this is no open market (Luppo, 2002); even players 
who have always operated shadily do so with various types of restrictions, 
because in order to set up and run operations in such a lucrative business you 
first have to secure the trust and permission of kingpins within the crime 
network. In a context of slow economic growth, more people may feel the allure 
of the risky crime-business and begin to organize their actions in order to escape 
detection and criminal charges, and that means playing by the necessarily violent 
and tawdry rules of operations outside the bounds of law. 
Transnational organized crime has caused violence in some sectors to 
soar, especially drug trafficking. Those who occupy strategic positions in the 
large transnational networks can earn big and fast due to the combination of 
few institutional limits and wholesale violence and corruption. Globally, they 
employ underground and violent practices for resolving conflicts, including 
threats, intimidation, bribery, extortion, aggression, murder and in some 
countries even terrorism. 
One problem in countries such as Brazil was summed up in an 
observation by Interpol chief Robert Kendall, when he said that far better than 
deploying the police to round up drug consumers or small dealers would be to 
channel much more of their resources into closing down the large dealers and 
money launderers. Unfortunately, the legislation, and much more so the police 
practices in various countries, including Brazil, steer them toward the former. 
For this reason, the symbiotic relations between different actors with common 
interests form a well-knit social, economic and institutional web that is difficult 
to escape once inside. This web composes what should be considered the 
systemic factors that exist inside and outside nations, in the transnational 
networks of criminal economic activities (Van der Veen, 1998).
Institutional corruption, disrespect for the law, inefficiency and 
discrimination in the Justice system in countries like Brazil cause urban 
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violence to increase at a disastrous rate. In Brazil, only recently have efforts 
been made to better understand illicit drug supply lines or the organizational 
strength of sales networks, especially their connections with the legal economy 
and its institutions. 
Despite the expansion of government power and increased funds 
for public control of these activities during the 1990s, only very recently 
was attention given to the economic and political interests related to the 
drug trade, particularly the carefully articulated interactions between the 
visible and the invisible operations, the legal and the illegal, the formal and 
informal sectors of the economy. In other words, while the Federal Police has 
investigated organized crime in recent years, the civil and special branches of 
state police forces are mainly engaged in violent repression in the shantytowns 
and ghettoes of metropolitan regions and state capitals. This has opened 
a niche for legitimate and clandestine  private security forces, though with 
little impact on the pervading sense of danger and insecurity among urban 
residents.  
 Illegal drug consumption and new criminality
The demand for drugs stems from lifestyle changes, which in turn, 
modify “style consumption” which is much more expensive than household 
consumption, that is, the domestic expenses related to traditional working and 
middle class families (Sassen, 1991). The sale of drugs can be considered an 
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Five minors caught dealing drugs are detained in a police operation in a Rio de Janeiro 
favela. Dealers recruit minors at an increasingly young age.
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illegal sector related to the distribution of goods and services designated “mass 
style consumption “. This process also favors the impressive increase found in 
certain crimes against property (theft and robbery) and against life (assault 
and homicide) (UNDCP, 1997). Post-war society underwent an accelerated 
process of economic, political and cultural transformation that led to social 
fragmentation and a growing importance placed on leisure activities and 
consumption as a means of defining new social identities, in particular those of 
the youth. In terms of social control, these changes indicate that conventional 
moral restrictions, which exist without the law, have weakened and that control 
now comes much more from policing and law enforcement. 
In fact, a revolution in consumption patterns also reached Brazil. A
plethora of consumer goods, constantly changing consumption styles and 
immense centers of leisure and consumption were the most striking visible 
change. Cultural values accompanied these changes in subjective formations: 
fiercely individualist and mercantile values were disseminated during the 1970s 
and 1980s, translated by such common expressions as “making easy money” 
and “milking everything”. In other words, Brazilian society, we could argue, 
was colonized by the market, though unaccompanied by the moral limits 
usually supplied by social forces. As an illegal and invisible activity, suited to a 
trend like this, drug dealing is part of this new social, economic and cultural 
environment.
Multidimensional explanation for violence
The consequences of the flourishing of these illegal businesses in 
Brazil, as well as the style that they took on here, cannot be explained by 
modifications in consumption or by poverty alone. Given that inequalities 
continue to exist on the social, economic and institutional planes, these new 
global forms of illegal and violent economic activity cannot be considered 
survival strategies by young people who often die before they reach 25. 
The combined effects of accelerated poverty and urbanization, without the 
necessary economic development to offer urban employment to migrants from 
rural regions and poor workers, are not sufficient to understand the armed 
conflict that kills young men. 
 In urgent need of discussion, considering the complexity of the 
situation, is how poverty and the lack of employment for poor youth is 
related to the mechanisms and institutional fluxes of the Justice system in its 
inefficient fight against organized crime. This cuts across all social classes and 
is connected to legal businesses and governments. 
In addition, rapid urbanization did not leave enough time for the urban 
social practices of tolerance and civility to spread among the new inhabitants 
of the cities or for the traditional moral values to be interiorized in the same 
way by new generations of urban residents. Thus, many poor young men 
become susceptible to the allure of the crime-business because of family crises, 
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many of them incapable of dealing with the conflicts thrown at them by this 
multifaceted and unpredictable urban life. They are also vulnerable because of 
the widening gulf between adults and youth, an inefficient educational system, 
a lack of professional training and dwindling job opportunities. These young 
men become violent because of a lack of socialization in civility and in the arts 
of negotiation, particular to a more diversified cosmopolitan urban world less 
segmented into closed kinship or regional groups. 
 Private and secular violence in Brazil
There are certainly connections between Brazil’s current urban violence 
and its history of predominantly rural violence. But is it possible to explain the 
current wave of violence as a simple consequence of the geological layers of 
violence common to rural Brazil? As in all countries, Brazil has a long history 
of institutional violence, and particularly private violence. But unlike other 
nations, torn by civil wars between political factions, or ethnic, racial and 
religious groups, the country has not suffered from political violence.
In fact, political elections in Brazil were always historically organized 
around multiple clienteles and mediators. Even the most powerful rural 
bosses, known as colonels, had to please the lower colonels if they wanted 
to be elected to Parliament or to the central government. The votes of their 
clients were purchased with private goods and services, but also by making 
real improvements to a region and through some pressure on voters. The 
balance between the central government and the provincial oligarchies caused 
negotiation and manipulation to become more important than open and 
violent conflicts. Although there have been various local conflicts, they never 
divided the entire country. 
Nor did slavery split the country into a civil war. Although it is true 
that slavery resulted in centuries of interpersonal violence between masters and 
slaves, any outbreaks of racial, religious or political hate were also transitory 
and localized. They never fractured the country into civil war. Some slave 
revolts ended with compromises in which the African descendents negotiated 
their rights to a weekly day of rest, as well as to dance and practice their 
religious rituals accompanied by the percussion instruments that characterized 
these rituals (Reis, 1986). It was thanks to this victory of slaves in Brazil that 
rural samba could be nurtured and eventually give rise to the urban samba of 
Rio de Janeiro, now a national trademark.
And so Brazil has none of the indelible traumas or deep-set hatred 
associated with civil wars involving ethnic, religious or political groups. 
Nor does it know the glories and suffering of revolutions. The musket, 
rifle or revolver never had the symbolic importance they acquired in other 
countries, although they were also used in conflicts. The cult of the firearm 
never developed in Brazil, as it did in the United States after the Civil War. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that violence did occupy a place, if limited, in the 
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social mindset, as it did in Portugal (Fatela, 1989). It is this private violence, 
and resulting social, economic and legal inequality that were the most 
important marks of Brazilian society, and they have persisted, in a transformed 
manner, to this day. 
There is no doubt that personal power and private violence were 
the privileges of the masters of the sugar mills and other large rural 
landowners. The “colonels” received this title because they had private 
troops of “jagunços”, or armed men, under their command and patrolling 
their properties. These troops were also used to compose the National 
Guard during the Imperial period in the 19th century. Personal revenge 
linked to clan disputes were common in a society segmented by local and 
kinship groups that clashed among each other for power and land ownership, 
at times over centuries. These family feuds in fact marked the history of 
violence in rural Brazil until the 20th Century, particularly in the Northeast 
and in the hinterlands of other states, the most violent regions of the country 
for many centuries.
In these locations ruled by local chiefs, judges did not have autonomy 
and their decisions usually benefited the powerful, whose crimes remained 
unpunished. One cannot say that the courts were above local private power, 
except in Rio de Janeiro, the capital, where the superior courts acquired the 
necessary independence. As a consequence, impunity has a long history in 
Brazil. Police forces were also formed to satisfy the land owners and were 
subordinate to them, restricting their actions to controlling the poor, the 
blacks and the Indigenous. 
As a consequence, such phenomena as the cangaçeiro in the Brazilian 
Northeast and similar bands of armed men in other regions of the country 
are explained by the moral dissatisfaction with the unjust functioning of 
the Brazilian institutions of the time and the codes of honor of a society 
segmented by kinship groups. These bands of armed men accompanied, in a 
visible and independent way, the family conflicts resulting from the struggle 
for local power, i.e., the control of land, wealth and institutions. 
Cordiality and the art of negotiation 
The culture of negotiation and tolerance, developed over the 19th 
and 20th Centuries, left traces on the history of Brazil. In the 17th century, 
the country was as  important a refuge for Jews as The Netherlands (Mello e 
Souza, 1987). It became so once again, before, during and after World War II. 
The Inquisition was present in Colonial Brazil, but never drove the population 
to fits of witch-hunting. In the 20th Century, immigrant Jews found a place in 
a country tolerant of different races and cultures.
This could be the reason why the arts of negotiation and conversation 
spread through the Brazilian population, especially in the urban areas of some 
Brazilian states. In a certain way, as expressed in numerous Brazilian songs, 
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these arts came to be part of the way of dealing with conflicts in various social 
fields. What appears to have always been celebrated and sung about in the 
urban environment was the ability to exchange ideas (Zaluar, 1985), especially 
among the poor population of the former federal capital, from where this 
practice spread throughout the country. An urban culture of tolerance and 
democratic culture of civility and of the arts of negotiation and conciliation, 
although restricted to some urban areas and only a part of the Brazilian 
political elite, came to characterize one of Brazil’s political cultures. 
This culture developed during at least a century of urban history in 
the arts of conversation and of pleasant sociability because they were cheerful 
and tolerant. It was exemplified by competitions among samba schools during 
Carnival, which were an important means of emotional venting, as well as 
sports and parliamentary sparring (Elias & Dunning, 1993). The city of Rio 
de Janeiro was accustomed to festivals that brought people from different areas 
together to compete or commemorate a given date (Zaluar, 1994 and 2004). 
At these encounters, the control of emotions, the basis for civilized behavior, 
was interiorized by the participants and infected others through a subjective 
formation associated with fair play and respect for one’s fellows.
Even in the rural environment, where there were family feuds, it was 
shrewdness, much more so than truculence and the weapons of the powerful, 
that was sung about in prose and verse in the popular culture. Is this animated 
discussion about notions of the “cordial Brazilian man” not shifting the 
focus somewhat from this important capacity to negotiate and its cultural 
importance to understanding the restricted, limited, localized and private 
violence in Brazil?
It could be said, for example, that elections in Brazil, although they 
have generated local conflicts, have been less violent than in other Latin 
American countries, for never having triggered national armed conflicts. 
When results were disputed or not accepted, the debacle was restricted to 
municipalities or small regions of this vast country. The revolution of 1930, 
when Vargas successfully launched a coupe d’état after a single election, did 
not lead to a national civil war, because he came to the table with the local 
oligarchies, even in São Paulo (Lamounier, 1977).
Clientelism and the lack of citizenship
After the deterioration of the personal power of the colonel, a new 
clientele was imposed: that organized by the political parties using the 
benefits obtained from government, namely tax revenues. But the system 
became more unstable for the politicians and less legitimized by the clients 
who came to consider the former as false bosses and friends (Zaluar, 
1985). Even so, clientelism persisted as an authoritarian manipulation used 
to win votes, impeding a true commitment to voters’ needs. The same 
manipulation is found in Congress as a means of winning a majority in the 
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house to get government actions approved. This form of negotiating the 
votes cast by parliamentarians paved the way to the corruption we still 
see today.
In fact, concerning the oscillation between centralization and 
decentralization, as well as the various interruptions of legality, parliamentary 
power had been institutionalized in Brazil since the Empire of the 19th 
Century. While there have been setbacks, it is undeniable that our liberal 
parliamentary tradition, established by the power that the oligarchies always 
had in various regions of the country, proved to be stronger than expected 
by supporters of authoritarianism and the military regime between 1964 
and 1984. The National Congress was only briefly dissolved. Nevertheless, 
the politicians who corroborated the decisions of the military were seduced 
through the granting of concessions and special contracts to companies 
and state governments of their choosing. The government continued to use 
corruption and clientelism as a strategy of control. 
The democratization that began in the late 1970s did not change the 
nature of the interplay between the Executive and Legislature. The opening 
of the regime was reduced to political rights and the electoral system: the 
direct vote for president. But democratization did not revive the urban culture 
of tolerance and the art of negotiation. It can thus be said that the worst 
effect of an exclusionary regime is that it destroys the democratic culture 
that is manifest in the daily social practices grounded in respect and civility 
towards others, in short, civic responsibility, including the art of negotiation 
traditionally nurtured in Brazilian cities. 
And so, while the military regime maintained the practice of 
negotiation in Congress, it cut the process at the root when it came to other 
forms of association, such as trade unions, resident associations and clubs. 
Such was the interference  within the unions that  many of their leaders 
migrated to the outskirts where they continued with their militancy under 
the watchful eye of the police, at least until the clamp-down enforced by the 
national security doctrine: the so-called “war against the enemy within”. The 
class conflict therefore shifted from the workplace to the place of residence 
where they could re-establish their demands within the clientelistic practices 
of politicians hungry for votes to win a seat in Congress. Nevertheless, in the 
community associations, increasingly tougher talk and authoritarian practices 
were further accentuated during the 25 years of the dictatorship, along with 
the increasingly common and brutal use of violence during police incursions 
into these locations. 
Non-intentional effects of the military regime
Not everything was forecast and planned by the Brazilian Armed Forces 
during the military regime. Unexpected consequences helped to change the 
situation of criminality and its repression.
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By having employed torture, illegal imprisonment and censorship, the 
military regime opened the doors for the dissemination of organized crime in 
various sectors. Some officials who had adopted these underground practices 
became members of death squads or extortion rackets. Others joined up with 
the bicheiros, the owners of the illegal numbers game, or with drug dealers 
(Gaspari, 2002). It was during the military regime that the bicheiros bought 
into and assumed control of the samba schools and their Carnival processions, 
transforming them into profitable companies. 
The accentuated clientelism of the toughest years of the military 
dictatorship and the new ideology of the communities wound up, in turn, 
recreating the rigid segmentation on a local level. The shantytown became a 
de facto neighborhood, due to its great internal socioeconomic, religious and 
cultural diversity. This segmentation made it easier for armed gangs to enter 
and dominate the shantytowns of the city.
Moreover, the military personnel involved with organized crime related 
to illegal gambling and drugs were protected under the “National Security 
Law”, which was only repealed in 1988, as well as the Amnesty Law of 1979. As
the law granted these officers immunity from criminal charges, those involved in 
spreading the practices of organized crime went unpunished. It is important not 
to forget that this form of conciliation imposed by the military was intended to 
repress the memory of their illegal acts, without proper public debate leading to 
conscious forgiveness and reconciliation on behalf of the Brazilian people. 
The result was that they also failed to discuss the consequences of 
the militarization of the police forces during the military regime or the 
outmoded forms of action long surpassed by a criminal world now governed 
by transnational organizations linked to legal businesses. Since there were few 
reforms to the Justice system and, more importantly, hardly any change in the 
police practices towards the poor, it can be said that the effects of the military 
regime are still present in the functioning of these institutions,  often blind to 
the civil rights of citizens. 
During the 1960’s, though the country did experience economic 
development during the military regime, this wealth was never distributed. 
This period was followed by a progressive recovery of democratic practices in 
elections and in the freedom of the press, but not in other social practices. 
Thus, during the democratization process in the late 1970s and throughout 
the 1980s, instead of economic growth, the country suffered various 
economic, moral and political crises initially provoked by spiraling inflation, 
and, after monetary stabilization, by problems within the Brazilian electoral 
system. Not only did the country have one of the world’s worst distributions of 
wealth, but also enormous inequalities in terms of access to Justice. Even after 
the enactment of the new Constitution in 1988, which guaranteed civil rights 
to all, the poor continued to suffer grave violations of these rights at the hands 
of the police. 
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Post-democratization institutionality and violence
The Brazilian economy diversified and modernized, while the 
democratization of its political and legal institutions lagged behind. The 
result was that even its most dynamic sectors still practiced illegalities, with 
companies  “cooking the books” to avoid taxes. This provided an excellent 
source of campaign funding for politicians willing to repay the favor with the 
concession of lucrative government contracts without the bidding processes 
required by administrative law. The country is now an electoral democracy, but 
campaigns are very expensive and candidates receive contributions, not always 
publicly declared, from many sources, including illegal businesses. 
The galloping inflation from which the country suffered until 1994 
was not only an economic reality, but also a social fact, at once material 
and symbolic. It had 
notable, irreversible 
and perverse effects on 
attitudes and values 
among the population, 
especially those who 
depended on salaries 
that could lose 60-80% 
of their value in a single 
month. This monetary 
situation facilitated the 
operation of organized 
crime groups in the 
hinterlands, as the 
volatility and speed 
of financial capital 
helped create a mirage 
of “easy money” 
that made money-
laundering much 
easier. In Brazil, those 
who began to practice 
increasingly audacious 
financial crimes abroad 
were helped by the 
growing difficulties 
in monitoring bank 
records and in 
maintaining control 
over public budgets 
and accounts. 
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Janete Silva de Araújo cries over the blood stain left on the 
ground by the body of her child who was killed in an exchange 
of gunfire between police and dealers in the Pavão-Pavãozinho 
Hill in Ipanema, Rio de Janeiro.
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With inflation contained in 1994, thanks to the success of the Real 
Plan which stabilized the currency in Brazil, was only left the volatility 
and the magic of the new international financial arrangements and the 
permanence of the international systems for laundering dirty money from 
both government corruption and illegal drug dealing. Since then, financial 
crimes have attracted much more attention and some wealthy or white 
collar criminals have been arrested. Even so, Brazilian banks tend to earn 
their profits not from loans but from other financial operations.
The rise of new informal-illegal markets is the other thread of 
the Brazilian paradox. Informal markets have always existed in Brazil 
and constitute an important source of income for the unemployed and 
poorly qualified. These markets traditionally created networks and rules 
to organize the commerce of craftsmen and women on the main streets of 
the largest urban centers. Nevertheless, in recent decades, these streets have 
become occupied by ambulant street vendors hawking objects stolen from 
trucks, homes and passersby. Informal commerce, traditionally an escape 
from unemployment and menial work, became mixed-in with criminal 
economic activities. Illegal activities also cropped up in junk yards, jewelry 
stores, mechanics shops and antique dealers, which became centers for 
receiving stolen goods and laundering money. Companies in the transport 
sector participated in the network of cargo theft on Brazilian highways. 
This cannot take place without efficient corruption strategies.
Even recognizing the importance of economic factors, there is no 
way to discard another important element in the growth of violent crime 
in Brazil: the precarious and uneven-handed workings of the Justice system 
due to illogical organizational practices and a defective Criminal Code. 
Together, they create “islands of impunity” (Dahrendorf, 1992) and a 
culture that is indulgent towards illegal practices.
Once again, connections between political power and 
institutions remain in the background. Although the Judiciary is now 
an independent power, (too independent according to some), state 
governors indicate members of state f iscal boards, which oversee and 
investigate public expenses. Governors also appoint some of the judges 
to the highest state courts, as well as civil and military police chiefs. All 
of these positions constitute easy sources of corruption, given that those 
who occupy them do not have the autonomy required to effectively 
combat violations of the law. 
The result of this was the development of an ethos of cynicism 
and disbelief towards moral values, which is clearly apparent among those 
who opt for criminal practices, regardless of their social class. This mark 
frontally distinguishes them from the rural outlaws who entered the bands 
of cangaceiros for moral reasons linked to kinship and the unjust operation 
of Brazilian institutions.
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Government Reform is much needed yet moves slowly. The 
extremely inefficient and unjust workings of the Justice System in Brazil plays 
an important role in the crisis of morality and weakening work ethic that 
permeate criminal practices across the social spectrum. But accountability, 
greater transparency and more severe punishments for those guilty of serious 
crimes at all the social levels are absolutely necessary if this tragic framework 
is to be changed. This is already underway, but subject to delays, setbacks 
and discontinuities. 
As such, the hardened core of discrimination in Brazil resides in the 
institutional sphere, that is, in the violations of the rights of the poorest due to 
the functioning of the justice system (Zaluar, 2001). This is particularly true 
of the bands of corrupt police who form the so-called “extortion rackets”, a 
more fitting name than “death squad”, as the main aim of these police officers 
is to extort a share of the intake of young dealers in poor neighbourhoods – 
the killing is reserved for those who don’t pay up.  The main source of violent 
death among the poor youth, however, remains the armed conflicts between 
rival drug gangs.  
The new criminality
The urban violence largely perpetrated by people who knew each other 
in so-called “crimes of blood” (Fausto, 1984) decreased relatively after World 
War Two. A new wave of homicides among people who did not know each 
other increased exponentially in the late 1970s as the authoritarian military 
regime came to an end. How can this new criminality be understood? 
The opening of the regime during the 1970’s coincided with a 
surprising growth in violent crimes, above all kidnapping, theft and homicide 
using firearms. These crimes grew very quickly in the capitals and metropolitan 
regions, in addition to some countryside cities in certain Brazilian states, such 
as Pernambuco, Espírito Santo, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Paraná. In the 
United States, this phenomenon had begun during the 1960’s, some fifteen 
years earlier. 
A careful study of police investigations and of criminal suits in 1991 in 
Rio de Janeiro showed that 57% of the homicides committed that year were 
related to drug dealing. In fact, this is only one of the many indicators that 
suggest that the increase in homicide rates can be linked to a heavier influx 
of firearms and narcotics into the country, seen as both phenomena increased 
simultaneously in the late 1970s.
Another indicator of the relationship between the wars among drug-
dealing gangs and murder rates is the age of the victims. As the rates of violent 
mortality increased throughout the country, the most common victims were 
not children, but adolescents, more precisely male youths in the metropolitan 
and other wealthy regions of the country. In fact, this rapid growth in 
homicides particularly affects male youths from 15 to 29 years of age, the 
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majority of victims or perpetrators of crimes committed in public places among 
people who were neither intimate nor even acquaintances. This is the same 
model found in conflicts over the division and defense of territories and of 
earnings among dealers and armed robbers, as developed during the violent 
competition between gangs in the ghettos of Los Angeles, Chicago and New 
York at the beginning of the 20th Century, and later, during the heroin, 
cocaine and crack epidemics of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s (Sullivan, 1992).
Moreover, the level of impunity in Brazil is also certainly a factor in 
the increased mortality among low-level dealers, given that these homicides 
are not carefully investigated. An incredibly high percentage of homicides are 
not subject to police investigation at all, and their authors are never identified. 
A study of the criminal justice system in São Paulo revealed that the largest 
percentages of condemnations are for those accused of drug dealing or theft 
and not those accused of homicide and armed robbery, the two crimes that 
generate most fear. Further proof is that, of 4,277 reported homicides, in only 
4.6% was the perpetrator or motive identified and recorded. In Rio de Janeiro, 
another study showed that 92% of the cases were thrown out of court due to 
insufficient evidence (Soares et al., 1996).
The police have the power to open an investigation upon recording a 
crime or any other item of proof necessary for a criminal process. Impunity is 
thus another effect of their professional ethos, and their lack of motivation to 
incorporate new investigative know-how and techniques. A revitalization of the 
police force is underway, mainly in the Federal Police, though much less so in 
the civil and military police corps on a state level. 
This is why a large percentage of criminals are never arrested or 
punished, which in turn is encouragement for them to commit further 
delinquent acts.  As money can buy impunity, either by bribing policemen into 
not filing charges or hiring well-paid lawyers to get you off if they do, having 
both on the pay-roll has become a very attractive proposition for drug lords. 
According to the youth, gang membership brings added security.  In 
fact, as they supply legal assistance, the higher up a youngster is in the chain 
of command, the less likely he is to go down for killing other poor youths. If 
money can buy their defense, and if firearms offer protection, it makes rational 
sense to commit more and more crimes in order to get more money and more 
weapons, resulting in more kudos within the gang and therefore more access 
to its protection. The preference for armed assault is also explained by the 
fact that the act can silence any possible witnesses through intimidation, and 
impose respect among accomplices through a blend of fear and admiration. 
Firearms can also be used to bribe the police. These are some of the ways to 
escape prison and make condemnation more improbable. 
In any case, events can frustrate plans. There is nothing to prevent a 
poor criminal from being beaten, tortured or extorted out of a quantity of 
money that he cannot provide. His weapon or the goods that he stole may be 
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taken, or he can even be arrested by police who may either want to raise their 
stake in the game or simply do their job. He can also be accused of crimes that 
he did not commit, which is a way of “solving” criminal cases more quickly. 
There are professional pressures and efficiency goals in the institutions that co-
exist with the ancient practices of violence and corruption.
A new, complex, diversified and very well-armed organization arose 
in which commercial and personal conflicts were resolved with firearms, and 
which created a cult of virility and violent exhibition of power. This created 
conditions that attracted many underprivileged youngsters to become involved 
in this deadly war among dealers, but that remains restricted to particular areas 
of the city. 
Unlike the Italian-American mafias, this organization in Rio de Janeiro 
never had the stable ties of loyalty that exist among people related by ritual 
kinship or blood. If there was some loyalty within the numbers rackets, this 
was never the case among drug dealers, making it much more difficult to 
maintain any link of personal loyalty, whether vertically or horizontally (as 
also occurred, incidentally, in the Italian Mafia, causing it to splinter) (Luppo, 
2002), In these groups, conflicts are a much more common way to settle 
scores and distribute wealth and power. 
Thus, drug dealing has become synonymous with war in many 
Brazilian municipalities, but with regional differences among cities and among 
neighborhoods in the same city. In Rio, even if not completely coordinated by 
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Presentation of ten rifles and a pistol that had been stolen by an armed gang from the 
Army Transport Center Establishment, in Sâo Cristovão, Rio de Janeiro.
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a Mafia-like hierarchy, the drug trade has an efficient horizontal arrangement. 
If there is a lack of drugs or fire arms in a favela, this arrangement makes it 
possible to immediately obtain more supplies from other allied shantytowns. 
These gangs or commands conciliate the mechanisms of a geographically 
defined network, which includes command centers and drug points, and 
other ones that are established at the basis of horizontal reciprocity. In Rio 
de Janeiro, firearms are more easily obtained because of the ports and various 
airports, as well as the most important silos of the Armed Forces. Many 
thefts took place and continue to occur in these warehouses, which do not 
have suitable stock control. As a result, drug dealing became more easily 
militarized. 
From this point of view, the enemy “commands” violently dispute 
the territories where they control business, and prohibit residents from areas 
controlled by their enemies to cross the borders onto their turf, even to visit 
friends or relatives. Hence the shantytown folk in certain neighborhoods of 
the city speak of an “interminable war” between dealers belonging to enemy 
commands or between the police and dealers. In this war, not only the gang 
members, but also the youth who live in these favelas or allied neighborhoods 
are required to donate their help each time the enemy attacks another gang 
that is part of the same command. The soldiers thus form a “bonde”, or “link” 
that will respond to an attack by another “bonde”, constituted in the same 
manner. For this reason, neighborhood residents do not have permission to 
cross the artificial borders between favelas. Many adolescents have been killed 
simply because they have passed from one sector to another commanded by 
feuding drug gangs, even if just to got to work or to a dance. 
 When “soldiers” are called up by the leading drug dealers, this call is 
aimed at youths who were able to get around the current regulations by which 
the Brazilian Armed Forces avoid recruiting youths from the shantytowns. 
In other words, they are those who have undergone military service, which is 
still mandatory. Even when they are not part of the drug gangs, these youths 
are “invited” to assemble and disassemble the army-issue automatic weapons 
stolen from military silos. They are called on to teach new soldiers involved in 
drug trafficking how to confront the enemies when the shantytown is invaded 
by the police or a rival gang. They must accept the “invitation” not so much 
because they are pressured, but because they feel obliged to collaborate with 
the gang that controls the neighborhood where they live. In any case, they 
know that refusal has a cost, on both the moral and physical planes: they 
would lose their recognition or consideration from the “boss of the hill”; 
they could be expelled from the favela; or even worse, executed. At times they 
are even invited to join the “bondes” about to invade enemy neighborhoods 
(Zaluar, 2001).
Due to these exchanges, adolescents are not only casualties of a war 
over the control of drug points, but also of a prevailing sense of status or 
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self-esteem predicated on demonstrations of virility and “manliness” (Alvito, 
1996; Lins, 1997), not in the sense of a mannerly gentleman, but in one’s 
capacity and willingness to destroy the enemy (Monteiro, 2003; Zaluar, 2004; 
Cecchetto, 2004).
It is those vulnerable youths who succumb to this seduction that 
become the dead bodies pushing up murder rates nationwide, especially in 
cities that in bygone centuries nurtured the cultures of tolerance, negotiation 
and civilized dispute in sport and diversion. They compose the statistics and 
the violent practices that impede improvements in the living conditions of the 
poor, despite advances in the Human Development Index (HDI), including 
increased schooling, reduced child mortality from infectious diseases and the 
lower proportion of poor people in the country. For how long?
Note
1  This is one of the main reasons why there is not a larger number of residents with 
firearms even today (7.5% in Belo Horizonte; 4.5% in Rio de Janeiro; 2.5% in São
Paulo). Nevertheless, it is another indicator that though the tools of armed violence 
are in few hands, their effects are widespread. 
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ABSTRACT - This article discusses two paradoxes and an enigma that have developed 
in Brazil in recent decades. The paradoxes are that the democratization process 
initiated in 1978 was accompanied by a spectacular increase in criminality and that a 
nation built upon ideas of cordiality and conciliation, recently shifted to mechanisms 
of personal revenge and uncontrollable aggressive impulses, given that neither 
forgiveness nor pacification were publicly discussed at the conclusion of the military 
regime. The enigma is that the brutal violence among young men is not found 
among women and other age groups. Unlike ethnic conflicts that affect everyone, in 
Brazil the vast majority of homicides is committed among young men and has grown 
exponentially in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Four dimensions are used to understand 
this: the international context of drug trafficking and fire arms; the importance and 
the limits of macro-social explanations of violent criminality that interact with the 
transnational mechanisms of organized crime; the inertia that explains the inefficiency 
of the justice system; and the micro-social processes or the subjective formations 
concerning the concept of masculinity in its relation with the exhibition of force, 
money and firearms.
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